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REPUBLICANISM
RICHARD DAGGER

is an ancient tradition of political thought that has enjoyed a remarkable revival in recent years. As with liberalism, conservatism, and other enduring
political traditions, there is considerable disagreement as to exactly what republicanism
is and who counts as a republican, whether in the ancient world or contemporary
times. Scholars agree, however, that republicanism rests on the conviction that government is not the domain of some ruler or small set of rulers, but is instead a public
matter-the res publica-to be directed by self-governing citizens.
This conviction historically has led republicans to be suspicious of or downright
hostile to monarchy, to the point where opposition to monarchy is often taken to
define republicanism. Hence the eminent historian of political thought Quentin Skinner refers to 'a republican (in the strict sense of being an opponent of monarchy) ... '
(Skinner 2008: 84). Dictionaries frequently add to this negative definition the positive
feature that republicans advocate government by elected representatives. Both points
are correct insofar as republicans have generally opposed monarchy and favored
representative government, but there is also reason to be cautious here-and reason
to look more closely at the definition of republicanism before turning to its history.
REPUBLICANISM

DEFINING REPUBLICANISM

··················································································································
Caution is necessary because important thinkers commonly linked to the republican
tradition, such as Aristotle and Cicero, were neither unequivocally opposed to monarchy
nor clearly committed to representative government. As they saw it, a form of government
is good if it will promote the public good. The problem with monarchy is not that
it cannot do this; in some circumstances, Aristotle says, monarchy is the form of
government most likely to promote the public good. The problem is that monarchs are
all too likely, when unchecked by others, to become tyrants. That is why Cicero and other

702

RICHARD DAGGER

classical republicans came to favor the mixed constitution (or mixed government) as a way
of preserving the rule of law. A mixed constitution blends the rule of one with the rule
of the few and of the many, so that the monarchical element will be limited rather than
absolute, with the monarch under the law rather than above it. In this limited, constitutional sense of'monarchy', republicans need not be opposed to monarchical governments.
If, however, one means by 'monarchy' rule by one person who holds complete, unchecked
authority, then a republican will necessarily be opposed to monarchy.
The connection between republicanism and representative government is similarly
complicated. As the historical accounts of the development of political representation
indicate, the terms 'republic' and 'republican' antedate the idea of government by
elected representatives. Mixed constitutions require that the few and the many have
a voice, but not that the members of either group elect those who speak for them. The
rule oflaw cannot be effective where no one makes laws, or discerns them in nature or
custom, but the legislator or legislators need not be elected. If the circumstances allow,
in fact, republicans may even embrace a form of direct democracy in which the people
as a whole are free to assemble, debate, and cast their votes for or against proposed
laws. To be sure, modern and contemporary republicans are typically advocates of
representative government, but that is because they do not think that circumstances are
favorable to the exercise of direct democracy-not, at least, when the public business
must be conducted on a scale as large as that of the modern state.
How, then, does a republic differ from a democracy? James Madison's famous
answer in Federalist 10 distinguished 'a pure democracy, by which I mean a society
consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government
in person' from a 'republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of
representation takes place ... ' (Ball 2003: 43-4). Madison was surely right to think that
no republican could countenance 'pure democracy', at least if it were understood to be
a form of government in which the people 'assemble and administer the government in
person' (emphasis added). Few self-professed democrats would disagree with republicans on this point, however. The important question is how a republic differs from a
democracy when the latter term is taken in the sense commonly attached to it in
current political discourse-that is, as representative democracy. To this there is no
clear-cut answer. Contemporary republicans, as we shall see, are committed to both
moral and political equality, so that they conceive of the republic as a kind of
democracy, not as something distinct from or opposed to it. The difference is thus a
matter of degree, not of kind. Republics and democracies are both forms of popular
government, but the republican-always fearful of unrestrained power-will be less
sanguine about the prospect of rule by the people than will the enthusiastic democrat.
The people must be heard, the republican will say, for government is the public
business of self-governing citizens; but government by the people should not be
confused with doing whatever the majority of the people want whenever they happen
to want it. A republic, according to the ancient formula, is the empire or government of
laws, not of men. If a democracy maintains its respect for the rule of law, then it is a
democratic republic; if not, it may be a populist, majoritarian, or plebiscitarian form of
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democracy, but it cannot be a republic. That is why republicans historically have
preferred the mixed constitution to one that is wholly popular or democratic.
Most republicans have preferred the mixed constitution, I should say, for, in this
respect, as in many others, those who have thought of themselves as republicans have
not always agreed with one another. John Adams and Thomas Paine disagreed on this
point, for example, with Adams staunchly defending mixed government and Paine
rejecting it in favour of 'simple' forms: 'I draw my idea of the form of government from
a principle in nature which no art can overturn, viz., that the more simple anything is,
the less liable it is to be disordered and the easier repaired when disordered' (Paine
1953 [1776]: 7). Yet each considered himself a republican. In this and other respects
Adams and Paine exemplify two tendencies within republicanism that another
eighteenth-century thinker, Montesquieu, previously had identified as 'aristocratic'
and 'democratic'.! Nor is this the only point on which the history of republicanism
has been marked by disagreement and divergent tendencies.

REPUBLICANISM CONSIDERED HrsTORICALL y

Whether Adams (1735-1826), Paine (1737-1809), Montesquieu (1689-1755), or any
other modern thinker really was a classical republican, or even a republican at all, is
not a settled matter. According to J. G. A. Pocock, 'Paine was no classical republican,
only a hater of monarchy ... ' (2003 [1975]: 575). For Pocock, who traces the 'Atlantic
republican tradition' of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries back through Machiavelli
to Polybius and Aristotle, Paine's approval of a national debt is reason enough to deny
his republican credentials. Debt is a form of dependence, and therefore something that
republicans want to avoid, not embrace; for a self-governing citizenry must be free from
dependence on those whose money or power would enable them to control or corrupt
the republic.
Pocock's emphasis on the continuity of the republican tradition puts him at odds
with a prominent group of scholars who believe that 'classical republicanism' is a term
that should be reserved for ancient philosophers and polities. As those in this group see
it, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and the other classical republicans of the ancient world
praised civic virtue-that is, the republican citizen's willingness to sacrifice personal
interest for the public good-because this virtue protected and preserved the polis or
civitas in which the highest virtues could be cultivated: 'Wherever the genuine classical
republican tradition still lives, there is some kind of agreement as to the supreme value
of the intellectual virtues, and of a life spent in leisured meditation on the nature of
justice, the soul, and divinity' (Pangle 1988: 61). Modern republicans, by contrast, are
1 'In a republic when the people as a body have sovereign power, it is a democracy. When the
sovereign power is in the hands of a part of the people, it is called an aristocracy' (Montesquieu 1989
[1748]: bk I, ch. 2, p. 10; emphasis in original).
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more likely to value individual rights and liberties than civic duties or virtuous devotion
to the public good. These modern or 'liberal' republicans-notably John Locke
(1632-1704), Montesquieu, and the American founders-share enough in common
with the classical thinkers to deserve to be called republicans, including devotion to
self-government and the rule oflaw. Under the influence of Machiavelli, however, they
depart from the classical tradition and embrace an aggressive or expansive republic in
which representative government supplants direct participation and virtue is as likely
to be the commercial virtue of the merchant as the civic virtue of the loyal citizen
(Pangle 1988; Rahe 1992; Zuckert 1994; Sullivan 2004).
Still, Pocock is not the only scholar to trace a continuous line of development in
republicanism from the ancient world to the modern. For some of them, however, the
line reaches back not to Greece but to Rome. Those who join Pocock in tracing
republicanism to Aristotle and Athens tend to emphasize the importance of active
participation in public affairs-of ruling and being ruled in turn, as Aristotle said in
The Politics (1283b42-1284a3). Those who see a closer link to Roman theory and
practice are more likely to stress the republican commitment to the rule oflaw (Sellers
1998) and to freedom as the absence of arbitrary or dominating power-to 'neo-roman
liberty', in Skinner's terms (1998). Scholars in both the Athenian and the Roman camps
agree that a modern political thinker can be a classical republican, then, but disagree as
to exactly what a classical republican is (Honohan 2002). Some even push the distinction to the point of arguing that the Athenian school of thought is really tracing the
development of civic humanism rather than classical (or civic) republicanism. That is,
civic humanism is 'a political philosophy centered on the idea of promoting a specific
conception of the good life as consisting in active citizenship and healthy civic virtue
on the one hand, while combating any sort of corruption that would undermine these
values on the other' (Lovett 2006: §3.1). As such, it differs from the more modest
philosophy of classical (or civic) republicanism, which takes political participation and
civic virtue to be 'instrumentally valuable for securing and preserving political liberty,
understood as independence from arbitrary rule' (Lovett 2006: §3.2). From this point
of view, a modern, civic, or neo-republican can be a classical republican, but only if
classical republicanism is understood to be distinct from civic humanism.
For present purposes, it seems best to take an inclusive or expansive approach to
republicanism, leaving the reader to decide what to make of these scholarly debates and
distinctions. Such an approach will begin with the thinkers of classical Greece, at the
latest. Indeed, some of the leading themes of republican thought are sounded in
dramatic works, such as the exchanges between Oedipus and Creon in Oedipus the
King (11. 626-30) and between Creon and Haemon in Antigone (11. 734-40)-exchanges
in which Sophocles (496-406/5 BCE) implies that the city state (polis) is not the sole
possession of the king, to be ruled simply as he sees fit, but a public trust. In his Oresteia
trilogy, Aeschylus (525-456 BCE) makes another proto-republican point with regard to
the rule of law, which the plays depict as superior to endless blood feuds and acts of
private vengeance. Similar themes mark the work of Greek philosophers. In his
Republic, for example, Plato (427-341 BCE) insists that the proper role of rulers is to
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protect the interests of the people, not to advance their own; and in the Statesman and
Laws he argues for the importance of the rule of law as, among other things, a
constraint on those who hold power.
Aristotle and Polybius, however, are the two Greek thinkers most often associated
with republicanism. As previously noted, Pocock and others take Aristotle (384-322
BCE) to be a republican largely because of his praise of the active life of the citizen who
rules and is ruled in turn. But his famous, if not entirely original, division of governments into six basic forms in Book III of The Politics (especially 1279a22-1279bl0) also
links him, in two further ways, to republicanism. First, Aristotle's criterion for distinguishing 'true' from 'perverted' forms of government is whether 'the one, or the few, or
the many, govern with a view to the common interest ... or with a view to the private
interest ... ' of the ruler(s) (Pol. 1279A29-32). The 'true' form of rule by the many he
calls 'polity' (politeia); the 'perverted' form, in which the many rule in their own
interest as a class, is 'democracy'. Second, he subsequently refers to 'polity', in a
different context and perhaps in a distinct sense of the word, as government by the
middle class that mixes two of the perverted forms, oligarchy and democracy. As he
says in Book IV, Chapter 11, moreover,
it is manifest that the best political community is formed by citizens of the
middle class, and that those states are likely to be well-administered in which
the middle class is large, and stronger if possible than both the other classes
[i.e. the rich and the poor], or at any rate than either singly, for the addition of
the middle class turns the scale, and prevents either of the extremes from being
dominant. Great then is the good fortune of a state in which the citizens have
a moderate and sufficient property; for where some possess much, and the
others nothing, there may arise an extreme democracy, or a pure oligarchy; or
a tyranny may grow out of either extreme ... but it is not so likely to arise out of
the middle constitutions and those akin to them. (Pol. 1295n34-1296A21;
emphasis added)
Like Aristotle, Polybius (c.200-c.l 18 BCE) believed that mixing two or more of the
forms of government would check the tendencies of the ruling group-whether
comprising one person, the few, or the many-to pursue its own interests, and thus
would promote the common good. Polybius took the idea further than Aristotle,
however, and he drew on Roman history and practice as much as Greek experience
in developing the theory of the mixed constitution. As a Greek leader held hostage in
Rome for seventeen years, Polybius had the opportunity to study what the Romans had
long regarded as their res publica-that is, the 'public thing' that was their body politic.
In his Histories, Polybius argued that each of the true or good forms of government
suffers from a tendency to degenerate over time into its corresponding corrupt or
perverted form: monarchy into tyranny; aristocracy into oligarchy; and rule by the
many, which he called 'democracy', into mob rule. Yet Rome had found a way to stave
off political decay and corruption by mixing or balancing rule by the one (the Roman
consuls), the few (the Senate), and the many (the people through various powers, such
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as the power to elect tribunes and to reward and punish their leaders). Corruption
might be inevitable, but for Polybius the republic, with its mixed constitution, offered
the best chance for a stable and long-lasting government in the public interest.
Roman political practice was probably more important to the subsequent development of republicanism than Roman political philosophy, but Cicero (106-43 BCE)
contributed in at least two ways to republican theory. First, he reinforced the claim that
there are both true and perverted forms of rule by one, the few, and the many, and he
agreed with Polybius when he insisted, in book I, §§54 and 69, of his Republic, that the
surest way to prevent corruption is through 'an alloy' that is 'balanced and compounded from' these forms of rule (1999: 24, 31). Cicero's second contribution was
his famous definition of the republic, or commonwealth, as 'not any group of men
assembled in any way, but an assemblage of some size associated with one another
through agreement on law and community of interest' (1999: 18). For Cicero, indeed,
'agreement on law' seems to be a large part of the 'community of interest' shared by
the citizens of a republic. Like the historians Sallust (c.86-34 BCE) and Livy (59/
64 BCE-17 cE), he took the republic to be an empire oflaws, not of men (Wirszubski
1960: 9).
An empire of men, or Caesars, soon eclipsed the Roman republic, however, and
republican theory declined along with republican institutions. The rise of Christianity,
with its tendency to discount the value of politics, may also have played a part in this
decline. Republican ideas survived in the Roman legal tradition, to be sure, and they did
not disappear completely from the political theory of late antiquity and the Middle
Ages. Thomas Aquinas (c.1225-74), for example, drew heavily on Aristotle in his
natural-law theory, defining law in his Summa theologiae (I-II. 90, 4 in c.) as an
'ordinance of reason for the common good'; and later declaring (ST 1-11. 95, 4 in c.)
that 'a form of government which is a mixture of the other types ... is the best'
(Aquinas 2002 [1266-73]: 82-3, 136). But it was a Renaissance Italian Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527) who seems to have contributed most to the revival ofrepublican
thought.
This revival began in the late Middle Ages, perhaps as early as 1085, when one after
another of the cities of northern Italy asserted its independence of the authority of the
papacy and the Holy Roman Empire (Skinner 2002: ch. 2). The revival eventually
included Machiavelli's Florence, where the republic was under continual threat from
both internal and external opponents. Although he is best known for the apparently
callous advice he offers in The Prince, Machiavelli stated his preference for republicanism in his Discourses on the First Ten Books of Titus Livius. In particular, he endorses
mixed government in Book I, Chapter 2, of the Discourses, praising Lycurgus for
establishing such a government in ancient Sparta and acknowledging Fortune for
fostering, in Rome, a republic in which 'all of the three types of government had
their shares', thereby producing 'a perfect state'. Friction played as much a part as
Fortune, though, as Machiavelli maintains that the Roman Republic achieved 'this
perfection ... through the discord between the people and the Senate ... ' (Machiavelli
1965: 200).
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Machiavelli had in mind the discord that emerges as the elements of a mixed
constitution check and balance one another-that is, the healthy discord or friction
that sustains the rule oflaw as it prevents any one element from dominating the others.
But it was the discord of the religious and political upheavals of early modern Europe
that spread the revival of republicanism. The early Protestants did not think of
themselves as republicans, but they began to resort to republican ideas to justify the
stances they took with regard to the secular authorities. Thus John Calvin (1509-64)
found himself appealing, in his Institutes of the Christian Religion (1536: bk IV, ch. 20, §31)
to the Spartan office of the ephor and the 'popular tribunes' of Rome when he suggested
that Christians may justly disobey their rulers when 'any magistrates appointed for the
protection of the people and the moderation of the power of kings' lend their authority
to disobedience (Calvin 1956 [1536]: 81). Subsequently, in the English Civil War and
Glorious Revolution of the seventeenth century, a number of writers pressed the 'neoroman' conception of liberty, according to which freedom is the absence of dependence or
domination (Skinner 1998). So conceived, freedom is not simply the absence of restraint
or interference, but freedom under or through the law, with the law to be determined in
some fashion by self-governing citizens.
The most notable of these neo-roman writers was probably James Harrington
( 1611-77), the author of Oceana. In the 'Preliminaries' chapter of Oceana Harrington
distinguishes between two ways of defining 'government'. On one side of the divide are
those who define 'government ... de jure or according to ancient prudence' as 'the
empire oflaws and not of men'; on the other, those who define it 'de facto or according
unto modern prudence ... ' In the former group he places Aristotle, Livy, and 'Machiavel (whose books are neglected ... )'; in the latter category are Thomas Hobbes
(1588-1679) and others who regard government as 'the empire of men and not oflaws'
(Harrington 1992 [1656]: 8-9). Linking himself to the former group, Harrington goes
on to endorse mixed government and two other schemes less commonly associated
with republicanism. One is a rota, or a system of rotating public offices so as to avoid
concentrations of political power; and the other is an agrarian law that would redistribute land in order to prevent concentrations of economic power-concentrations
that would render some citizens dependent upon the will of others.
In the eighteenth century republican concerns were central to the revolutions in
North America and France, with Harrington a writer much admired by the American
revolutionaries. Perhaps the clearest evidence of their republican tendencies appears,
however, in the new governments that emerged from these revolutions. In the United
States, the Constitution ratified in 1788 guarantees every state of the union 'a Republican
Form of Government' (art. IV, §4); and in the next decade the French revolutionarieswho attempted to replace the traditional monsieur and. madame with citoyen and
citoyenne (citizen)-declared the abolition of the monarchy and the formation of the
French Republic. In the course of the ratification debates, moreover, the principal authors
of The Federalist-Alexander Hamilton (1757-1804) and James Madison (1751-1836)drew on Montesquieu's Spirit of the Laws to counter the claim that the new country
would be too large to survive as a republic. It would not be too large, they argued,

708

RICHARD DAGGER

especially in Hamilton's Federalist 9, because the United States would be a 'compound' or
'confederate' republic-that is, a large republic composed of smaller republics.
What exactly should be the proper relationship between this large republic and
its constituent republics became the subject of long and sometimes ferocious controversy in the United States. That the country should be a republic, however, was
never in dispute. Agreement as to the desirability of republican government became
increasingly widespread in Europe and Latin America, too, though not without
resistance on the part of defenders of monarchy, theocracy, and, in the twentieth
century, fascism and communism. By the twentieth century, however, republicanism
was no longer a central concern of political philosophers. In part this was the result
of the growing attention to democracy, and in part the result of the rise of liberalism,
conservatism, and socialism-all of which bear the traces of republican concepts and
principles.

CONTEMPORARY REPUBLICANISM

For much of the twentieth century, at least in the English-speaking world, republicanism seemed more a matter of historical than of philosophical interest (e.g. Fink 1962
[1945]; Robbins 1959; Pocock 2003 [1975]). Books such as Hannah Arendt's On
Revolution (1965) and Sheldon Wolin's Politics and Vision (1960) powerfully stated
republican themes, but neither Arendt nor Wolin advertised these books as contributions to republican theory. Interest in the possibilities of such a theory revived in the
last decades of the century, however, and especially so with the publication of Philip
Pettit's Republicanism (1997). 2 Pettit's book and subsequent essays are noteworthy for
many reasons, but in particular for his claim that 'the supreme political value' of
republicanism is freedom, with freedom understood to be freedom from domination
(Pettit 1997: 80). Whether this is a uniquely republican or even an adequate conception
of freedom is now the subject of considerable controversy, with Pettit and Skinner
vigorously responding to their critics (e.g. Pettit 2008; Skinner 2008). Whether republicanism itself is an adequate or distinctive political philosophy is the subject of a
broader controversy (e.g. Gey 1993; Goodin 2003; Brennan and Lomasky 2006). There
is no doubt, though, that a republican revival is well underway, with various civic or
neo-republicans working to demonstrate the merits of this ancient theory in the
twenty-first century (e.g. Sandel 1996; Viroli 2002; Maynor 2003). These efforts include
attempts to draw out the implications of republicanism for economic matters (e.g.
Dagger 2006 and Pettit 2006, both responding to Gaus 2003), for criminal justice and
the law more generally (e.g. Braithwaite and Pettit 1990; Besson and Marti 2009), for
welfare policy (White 2003), and for the problems of culturally pluralistic societies

2

See Dagger (2004) for a more complete account of these developments.
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(Laborde 2008). These and similar efforts may or may not prove to be widely persuasive among political philosophers, but they testify nevertheless to the enduring conviction that animates republicanism-that is, the conviction that government is a public
matter to be directed by self-governing citizens.
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